01 · A good payment
One curl. A real PASS.
This is a canonical x402 payment request: 0.01 testnet USDC on Base Sepolia, a known payee, a known resource. Paste it as-is. The analysis reads mainnet chain data; this demo's payment rail is testnet-only.
POST /preflight · free
curl -sS -X POST https://vex402.online/preflight \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{
"kind": "payment",
"payment": {
"scheme": "exact",
"network": "eip155:84532",
"asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
"amount": "10000",
"payTo": "0xAeEF086DD4e436c69d6d0F684b4c9F43392df9cb",
"resource": "https://vex402.online/verify",
"maxTimeoutSeconds": 60
},
"policy": { "maxAmountUsd": 0.25, "allowedResourceHosts": ["vex402.online"] }
}'
amount is in raw units: 10000 = 0.01 testnet USDC (6 decimals). Free hosting sleeps: the first call after a pause can take ~30 seconds. This is the free gate: no payment is sent.
Response · abbreviated
{
"verdict": "PASS",
"sign_allowed": true,
"requires_ack": false,
"reasons": [],
"checked": ["scheme", "network", "asset", "amount", "payee", "resource_url", "resource_host", "timeout", "block_freshness"],
"notChecked": ["recipient reputation", "sanctions screening", "payment signature / signed payload", "facilitator settlement", "off-chain promises", "counterparty identity / tool metadata", "payTo ownership / proven seller payout wallet", "obligation state (idempotency key, cumulative spend, grant balance)", "prompt injection / hidden Unicode in tool output", "payer_balance"],
"block": { "number": 52814257, "ageSeconds": 0 },
"receipt": { "id": "pf_…", "expiresAt": "…", "signature": "…" }
}
Your block number will differ. sign_allowed is simply verdict !== "BLOCK"; a CAUTION still needs a decision.
02 · A bad signature
The same gate says no to an unlimited approval.
This calldata is USDC approve(spender, 2^256-1) — the classic “let this contract take everything” signature. With forbidUnlimitedApproval set, it is a hard block.
POST /preflight · free
curl -sS -X POST https://vex402.online/preflight \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{
"kind": "transaction",
"chainId": 8453,
"to": "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913",
"data": "0x095ea7b30000000000000000000000001111111111111111111111111111111111111111ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
"value": "0",
"policy": { "forbidUnlimitedApproval": true }
}'
Response · abbreviated
{
"verdict": "BLOCK",
"sign_allowed": false,
"reasons": [
{
"code": "unlimited_approval",
"severity": "block",
"message": "approve grants an unlimited allowance and policy.forbidUnlimitedApproval is set"
}
]
}
Add "from": "0xYourPayerAddress" to enable simulation. Without it the response also carries a simulation_skipped_no_from caution — the gate names what it could not check.
03 · The receipt
Verify before you trust it.
Every verdict carries an HMAC-signed receipt bound to the exact normalized intent, the request body the gate received, and the block. POST /preflight/verify recomputes the signature, checks expiry, and re-hashes the caller's request and optional intent. A tampered copy returns bad_signature; an altered request returns request_mismatch.
Node · verify, then sign
const gate = await fetch("https://vex402.online/preflight", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify(intent),
}).then((r) => r.json());
const check = await fetch("https://vex402.online/preflight/verify", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ receipt: gate.receipt, request: intent }),
}).then((r) => r.json());
if (!check.valid || check.requestBound !== true) throw new Error(`receipt rejected: ${check.reason || "not bound to this request"}`);
Receipts expire after 90 seconds by default (15–300 configurable). Re-call the gate instead of reusing an expired one. If the chain cannot be read, the gate returns 503 and no receipt — fail-closed.
04 · Inside the agent
One MCP tool, no wallet.
Run with npx, or add the server to Claude Desktop, Cursor, OpenCode or any stdio MCP client. With no EVM_PRIVATE_KEY, only the free tools (preflight_gate, inspect_402, directory_402) are registered — nothing can be charged. Published on npm as verify402-mcp and listed on the official MCP Registry.
Run via npx · free gate
npx -y verify402-mcp --help
.cursor/mcp.json · free-only
{
"mcpServers": {
"verify402": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"verify402-mcp"
],
"env": { "VERIFY402_URL": "https://vex402.online" }
}
}
}
The MCP tool is advisory. Enforce it where the signing happens.
The bridge cannot stop an agent that ignores the answer. Use the reference executor: it verifies the receipt, checks both bindings locally, and refuses to call your signer on BLOCK, a missing/expired receipt, or a failed verify. It holds no key and has no verification bypass.
05 · What I need back
The only failure: a false PASS.
Run 3–5 intents your agent would actually sign — or has signed before. Send the intent (redacted is fine), the verdict, and the reasons. The number that does not exist yet is the false-PASS rate: a transaction the gate passed that you believe is unsafe.
The gate is free and rate-limited. The five paid measurements — /verify, /safety, /route, /quotecheck, /depth — are separate and not needed for this test.
What the gate does not do
It catches measurable signing mistakes: wrong network, non-canonical asset, amount over your cap, payee outside your allowlist, unlimited approval, a reverting call, a stale block. It does not screen reputation or sanctions, audit a contract, simulate full balance deltas, audit the counterparty, scan tool output for hidden instructions, or guarantee a token is safe. Those limits are printed in notChecked on every response. A PASS means the checks in checked passed at that block — nothing more.