verify[402]
snapshot · block — Run free check

Free · before the signature

The check before the signature.

One call for any x402 payment request or chain transaction. It returns PASS / CAUTION / BLOCK, the reasons, the checks that actually ran, and a short-lived receipt bound to the exact intent — so an executor can refuse to sign without one.

Free · no wallet Payments: Base Sepolia demo Analysis: mainnet chain data Fail-closed

Try it · free · no wallet

Check an approval before you sign it.

Paste the token and spender. We build the unlimited approval and ask the live gate whether it should be signed. Nothing is signed or paid.

Live chain data No wallet Fail-closed

Simple check

Paste a token address. Check the approval.

We build an unlimited approval and ask the live gate whether it should be signed. No wallet, no payment.

The spender is the contract asking for permission to move your tokens — it appears as “spender” in the signature prompt. This checks the token contract, the spender, the calldata, and the block. It is not a token safety or sellability rating. The token must exist on the selected network.

Advanced: paste the raw JSON

This sends the JSON to POST /preflight. Do not paste private keys or seed phrases. The first call after idle can take ~30s; rate limits apply.

Ready

Ready when you are.

Run a check to see the verdict, the reasons, the checks that ran, and the receipt.

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No wallet, account, or paid call. The gate never moves funds.

Two intents, one verdict

One gate for both.

“If I sign this, what will the chain do — and is that what I think it is?” The gate answers the part that is measurable at a block, and names the part that is not.

Ask before you sign.

Intent · payment

Validate the 402 before you pay it.

Checks the scheme, CAIP-2 network, the payment asset (canonical USDC, or another recognized dollar stable such as USDT, DAI, or USDG, named instead of flagged), raw amount, payTo, resource URL, timeout and authorization window. On EVM it also reads the payer's USDC balance. A swapped payTo or a lookalike asset is exactly the failure this catches.

Intent · transaction

Simulate the call, decode the calldata.

Decodes transfer, approve, transferFrom, permit, and common V2/V3 swap selectors. Checks unlimited approvals, spenders, swap deadlines, zero minimum output and the output recipient. Then simulates the call from your wallet at the current block. EVM only today (Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base).

What it answers

Three verdicts, because two would lie.

VerdictMeaningWhat an agent should do
PASSEvery check in checked passed at this fresh pinned block. On EVM, >30s is CAUTION and >120s is BLOCK.Proceed. Still read notChecked.
CAUTIONA check needs a decision: an unvetted spender, a non-canonical asset, unknown calldata, no from to simulate.Surface the reasons to the operator. Sign only with explicit acknowledgement.
BLOCKA hard check failed: a revert, a wrong asset, an expired authorization, a non-contract target, an allowlist mismatch.Do not sign. Change the transaction, not the gate.

Fail-closed is part of the contract

If the chain cannot be read, the gate returns 503 and issues no receipt. An executor should refuse to sign without a verifiable receipt — a fast wrong answer is worse than a slow honest one.

01 · Payment

Check the 402 challenge.

Pass the challenge as your agent received it. from is optional, but supplying it enables the balance check and makes the verdict stronger.

Request

curl -X POST https://vex402.online/preflight \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "kind": "payment",
    "from": "0xYourWallet",
    "payment": {
      "scheme": "exact",
      "network": "eip155:84532",
      "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
      "amount": "10000",
      "payTo": "0xAeEF086DD4e436c69d6d0F684b4c9F43392df9cb",
      "resource": "https://vex402.online/verify",
      "maxTimeoutSeconds": 60
    },
    "policy": { "maxAmountUsd": 0.25, "allowedResourceHosts": ["vex402.online"] }
  }'

Optional: bind the payout wallet and local obligation state

The public gate has no cross-process payment ledger. If your agent already keeps one, pass it in:

{
  "payment": {
    "idempotencyKey": "pay-2026-10-24-001",
    "payTo": "0x…",
    …
  },
  "policy": {
    "sellerPayoutWallets": ["0xSellerPayout"],
    "sellerPayoutManifest": {
      "url": "https://seller.example/.well-known/verify402.json",
      "expectedSigner": "0xSellerSigner"
    },
    "obligation": {
      "settledKeys": ["pay-2026-10-23-014"],
      "spentUsd": 0.24,
      "grantUsd": 0.25
    }
  }
}

sellerPayoutWallets is only a caller-supplied allowlist. A match adds payee_payout_allowlist, not a binding. sellerPayoutManifest fetches a seller-signed manifest from a caller-pinned HTTPS origin outside the 402; only a verified manifest match adds payee_payout_binding. A settled key is BLOCK; adding this payment to spentUsd above grantUsd is BLOCK. Without this state, both gaps stay named in notChecked.

Response · abbreviated

{
  "verdict": "PASS",
  "sign_allowed": true,
  "requires_ack": false,
  "reasons": [],
  "checked": ["scheme", "network", "asset", "amount", "payee", "resource_url", "resource_host", "payer_balance", "block_freshness"],
  "notChecked": ["recipient reputation", "sanctions screening", "payment signature / signed payload", "facilitator settlement", "off-chain promises", "counterparty identity / tool metadata", "payTo ownership / proven seller payout wallet", "payee wallet ownership (seller-signed manifest only)", "obligation state (idempotency key, cumulative spend, grant balance)", "prompt injection / hidden Unicode in tool output"],
  "payeeBinding": {
    "source": "seller_manifest",
    "matched": true,
    "origin": "https://seller.example",
    "signer": "0xSellerSigner",
    "expiresAt": "2026-11-24T00:00:00Z",
    "manifestHash": "…"
  },
  "receipt": {
    "spec": "verify402/preflight-receipt@1",
    "intentHash": "…",
    "requestHash": "…",
    "blockNumber": 48277717,
    "expiresAt": "2026-10-19T…Z",
    "signature": "…"
  }
}

02 · Transaction

Check the calldata and the simulation.

EVM only today (Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base). If from is present, the gate simulates the call at the current block. Without it, simulation is skipped and the verdict is at most CAUTION — because a call from the zero address proves nothing.

Request

POST /preflight
{
  "kind": "transaction",
  "chainId": 8453,
  "from": "0xYourWallet",
  "to": "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913",
  "data": "0x095ea7b3…",
  "value": "0",
  "policy": {
    "forbidUnlimitedApproval": true,
    "allowedSpenders": ["0x…"]
  }
}

Decoded actions: transfer, approve, transferFrom, permit, Uniswap V2 exact-in and V3 exactInputSingle. Unrecognized selectors are a CAUTION, never a silent pass.

The honesty boundary

Checked, and deliberately not checked.

CheckedNot checked
Network, asset, amount, payee, resource URL, resource host when policy binds it, timeout, authorization window; payout allowlist when the caller supplies sellerPayoutWallets; signed payout binding when a verified sellerPayoutManifest matches Whether the recipient is a scammer or a sanctioned address; independent proof that the seller controls the payout wallet
EVM block freshness: >30s CAUTION, >120s BLOCK Gas price/limit chosen by the signer; raw signed-transaction binding
Payment request fields and authorization window Payment signature/signed payload; facilitator settlement
Canonical USDC and a sane raw amount; payer balance on the payment network when a payer is supplied Contract audits, proxy upgrades, owner privileges
Calldata decode, contract bytecode, and a eth_call simulation Full balance-delta / state-change simulation
Unlimited approvals, spender allowlists, swap deadline, minimum output, output recipient MEV, sandwich protection, route quality beyond the decoded minimum
Receipt integrity: HMAC, intent hash, block, expiry; settled idempotency key and cumulative spend/grant when the caller supplies policy.obligation Counterparty identity, tool metadata, obligation ledger persistence across processes, independent payTo ownership proof, hidden Unicode / prompt injection in tool output, or off-chain promises: “the seller will deliver after you pay”

A PASS means the left column passed at that fresh block. A block with no timestamp is a 503, not a pass. It is not a guarantee that the transaction will execute, settle, or be honest, and it is not a counterparty audit or prompt-injection filter. The right column is named on every response so nobody has to infer it.

Receipts

A receipt an executor can actually check.

Every response carries a short-lived HMAC-signed receipt. The intent hash binds the exact normalized request, the request hash binds the original body, the fresh block pins the chain state, and the expiry bounds reuse.

Call the gate

One request, one verdict, reasons and a receipt. Free, rate-limited, and fail-closed.

Verify the receipt

POST /preflight/verify recomputes the HMAC, checks the expiry, and re-hashes the caller's normalized intent and original request. Require both intentBound and requestBound; a receipt-only check stays compatible but is unbound. No chain call.

Sign or refuse

An executor should require sign_allowed. A CAUTION is an explicit decision, not a pass. Reference guard. Put the gate in an agent with the MCP server.

Why is the gate free?

Because it has to be in the path before every signature. A toll booth there would be a tax on safety. The deep measurements — /verify, /safety, /route, /quotecheck, /depth — remain paid. The gate is the front door, not a replacement for them.